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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 960234-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from acceptance of a plea in abeyance to
the charge of aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996).
This Court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal
pursuant to Point I, infra.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court's written order accepting

defendant's plea in abeyance and setting forth the
conditions with which defendant must comply over the

duration of the abeyance period constitutes a final written
order from which defendant may take a direct appeal.
This issue presents a question of law which this Court
reviews de novo. See generalXy State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,
935-36 (Utah 1994).
2.

Assuming this Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal, did the conditions adopted by the trial court exceed
the scope of conditions permitted under the plea in abeyance
statutes?
As this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the
appeal, no standard of review applies to this issue.
Alternatively, issues of statutory interpretation present
questions of law which are reviewed on appeal for
correctness.

State v.

Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah

1996); State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah App. 1995),
cert, denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues

2

presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this
brief.

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
On December 12, 1995, defendant was charged with
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996) (R. 1-2). Defendant
waived his preliminary hearing, and was bound over to
district court for trial (R. 10). On January 29, 1996, a
change of plea hearing was held in which defendant withdrew
his plea of not guilty, entered a plea of guilty to be held
in abeyance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l, g£ seq. (a
copy of the statutes is attached as addendum A ) , and
executed a plea in abeyance agreement (R. 21, 25-27;
Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing [hereinafter "Plea
Tr."] 2-3, 9) (a copy of the written agreement is attached
as addendum B ) .

The district court referred defendant to

Adult Probation and Parole for a recommendation as to
additional conditions to be imposed pursuant to the terms of
the written agreement (R. 22, 26-27; Plea Tr. 9-10)•

3

On February 26, 1996, a disposition hearing was held at
which both counsel and defendant addressed the court (R. 2324; 3 8-45) (a copy of the hearing transcript is attached as
addendum C).

The trial court then imposed additional

conditions to accompany the conditions contained in
defendant's plea in abeyance agreement (R. 28, 45-47). Those
conditions included a "fine and surcharge" of $ 925.00,
together with "1 year in the Box Elder County Jail with
release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be
arranged" and a provision that the remainder of the jail
sentence be "suspended upon [defendant] successfully
completing the inpatient program" (R. 30, 45A) .x Addendum
C.

The Court then directed defendant, his counsel, and his

probation officer "to get busy and start to find out where
you can get into a program . . . ." (R. 47). Apparently
between May 6 and May 20, 1996, defendant was released to
the Salvation Army Program (R. 52, 57).
x

The transcript of the February 26 disposition hearing
is paginated as part of the record with the exception of
page 45A. That page is internally paginated as page 11 and
falls between record pages 45 and 46. The State cites it as
"R. 45A" throughout this brief.
4

Defendant appeals from the trial court's written order
dated February 29, 1996, memorializing the acceptance of the
plea in abeyance and the imposition of conditions.

STATEMENT QF FACTS
On December 6, 1995, defendant entered the home of
Patsy Fridal and demanded that she give him the knives he
had purportedly left there earlier (R. 4; Plea Tr. 6). When
Ms, Fridal gave defendant a single knife, defendant insisted
that there should be more (Plea Tr. 6). Defendant then
opened the blade of the knife he held, pointed it in
Fridal's direction and waived it while he made some
threatening comments to Fridal (R. 4; Plea Tr. 6-7). He was
apprehended shortly thereafter, showing numerous signs of
intoxication (R. 4; Plea Tr. 6-7).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Point I: This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
this appeal because the order from which defendant appeals
is not a final order, as required by the rules of appellate
procedure.

The challenged order reflects the trial court's

acceptance of defendant's plea in abeyance and imposes
5

certain specific conditions on defendant.

The order did not

end the proceedings, and it left open questions for further
action by the court, which action is inevitable under Utah
law.
Defendant failed to comply with this Court's
requirements for perfecting an interlocutory appeal.
Because rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, prohibits
this Court from suspending those requirements, this Court
should reject defendant's request that his direct appeal be
considered to be an interlocutory appeal should this Court
find that the order is not a final appealable order.
Point II: This Court should not reach defendant's
objection to the trial court's imposition of a fine because
he raises the issue for the first time on appeal.
Defendant's objection to the trial court's imposition of
jail time as a condition of his plea in abeyance is without
merit because the trial court's actions are expressly
permitted by the plain language of the relevant statutes.

6

ARGUMENTS

THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
IS NOT A FINAL ORDER; FURTHER, DEFENDANT HAS NOT
COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FILING AN
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, AND THOSE REQUIREMENTS
CANNOT BE SUSPENDED

ha.

The Challenged Order Is Not A Final Order From Which A
Direct Appeal Lies
Defendant claims that the trial court's written order,

memorializing the court's acceptance of the plea in abeyance
and imposing numerous conditions with which defendant agreed
to comply under the plea agreement, constitutes a final
order from which he may take a direct appeal.

Appellant's

Br. at 7-12 (a copy of the order is attached as addendum D ) .
He claims that the challenged order is final because it
terminated the "particular proceeding" before the court and
"specified with certainty a final determination of the
rights of the parties."

Id. at 9-11.

However, this

argument misinterprets Utah case law and ignores the plain
language of the relevant statutes.

7

A direct appeal lies from "all final orders and
judgments."

Utah R. App. P. 3(a). A final, appealable

order must completely determine the rights of the parties
and end the proceedings, "leaving no question open for
further judicial action."

State in Interest of T.P,C, 748

P.2d 201, 202 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1988); £££ fliSQ Kessimakis Vt Kessimakis/ 546 P.2d 888, 889
(Utah 1976) (holding that a divorce decree which did not
become final until three months after its entry was a final
appealable order where there were "no other proceedings to
be had in order for it to become final").

The challenged

order neither ends the proceedings nor leaves no questions
open for additional action by the court where subsequent
proceedings related to the plea in abeyance are inevitable.
Defendant's arguments do not change the fact that he
voluntarily entered a plea in abeyance below.

It is clear

from the plain language of the statutes that "[a]cceptance
of a plea in abeyance and the entry of judgment of
conviction and the imposition of sentence are not
simultaneous events."

State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021, 1025
8

n.7 (Utah App. 1996); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-l(l),
-2(1) (1995), and 77-2a-3(l) (Supp. 1996).

The plain

language of the statute clearly contemplates court
involvement after acceptance of a plea in abeyance,
regardless of whether the defendant is successful or
unsuccessful in complying with the conditions of the plea.
The trial court eventually must act in one of two ways: 1)
issue an order to show cause, conduct an evidentiary
hearing, enter a finding, if appropriate, that defendant has
"failed to substantially comply with any term or condition
of the plea in abeyance agreement," then terminate the
agreement, and enter judgment of conviction and impose
sentence against defendant (Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l)); or
2) enter a finding that defendant has successfully completed
the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement, permit
defendant to withdraw his plea, and, in this case, dismiss
the charge against defendant.
and (3). Addendum A.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(2)

Consequently, the trial court's

acceptance of a plea in abeyance "is not a final
adjudication."

Moss. 921 P.2d at 1025 n.7.
9

Here, the trial court and both parties recognized this
fact.

Defendant executed a plea in abeyance agreement

stating that he understood that after acceptance of his
plea, there would be further proceedings before the court,
either to determine whether he "failed to substantially
comply with any term or condition of the Judgment and Order"
and to then "terminate the agreement and enter judgment of
conviction and impose sentence", or to determine "that the
defendant has successfully completed the terms and
conditions of th[e] Plea in Abeyance Agreement" and to
"dismiss the charge of Aggravated Assault" (R. 26) .
Addendum B.
The trial court also recognized that it was neither
sentencing defendant nor entering a final adjudication of
the matter.

The judge stated at the February 26, 1996,

hearing that he was merely imposing "additional conditions
for the plea in abeyance" (R. 45; Addendum C) , and the
written order explicitly recognized that proceedings
involving the plea were to be on-going, providing:

10

The court retains jurisdiction to make such other
and further Orders as it may deem necessary from time
to time, and, further, retains jurisdiction to
terminate the terms and conditions hereof and enter
defendant's plea of guilty. The Court further retains
jurisdiction to sentence the defendant, either at such
time as this Order is terminated, or at such time as
the defendant successfully completes the terms and
conditions hereof.
(R. 29-32). Addendum D.
This record demonstrates that all involved knew that
the proceedings did not end with the imposition of
conditions, that further judicial action was inevitable, and
that the rights of the parties would not be fully defined or
settled until such time as the plea was withdrawn and the
charges dismissed, or judgment and sentence were entered.
Defendant argues that the order was final because it
ended the proceedings in which conditions were imposed upon
defendant.2

Appellant's Br. at 9-10.

2

However, defendant

Defendant asserts that entry of judgment and
imposition of sentence would occur in separate proceedings
based on his guilty plea inasmuch as the plea in abeyance
agreement would first be terminated. Appellant's Br. at 910. His argument is without merit, however, as the language
of defendant's written agreement, as well as that of section
77-2a-4(l), contemplates that judicial action occur before
the agreement can be terminated.
11

ignores the trial court's explanation at the February
hearing that his usual practice when faced with defendants
who have violated the terms of their pleas in abeyance is to
"restart[] probation or add[] additional terms" (R. 41).
Addendum C. Consequently, additional proceedings to set
additional conditions were still possible, rendering
defendant's argument unpersuasive.
No matter what happened once the court accepted
defendant's plea, further court action was mandated by law
in order to complete the proceedings and finally dispose of
the charges against defendant based upon his own compliance
(or lack thereof) with the plea agreement.

The challenged

order neither terminated the proceedings before the court
nor provided a final determination of the rights of the
parties.

Accordingly, the written order memorializing the

trial court's acceptance of the plea in abeyance and
imposing additional conditions upon defendant is not final
for purposes of appeal.
Moreover, in a criminal case, Mi]t is the sentence
itself which constitutes a final judgment from which
12

appellant has the right to appeal."
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1978).

State v. Gerrard, 584

In this case, defendant was not

sentenced and may never be sentenced.

Consequently, the

challenged order is a pre-sentence order from which an
appeal does not lie.

See id. at 886 (all "incidents,

impressions, or statements made by the court" prior to
sentencing "are not the judgment of the case and, therefore,
are not appealable").
This does not mean that defendant was without a
recourse when the trial court imposed conditions with which
he did not agree.

Upon imposition of the challenged

conditions, either orally at the February 26 hearing or in
writing on February 27, defendant was free to seek
withdrawal of his plea in abeyance because the thirty-day
withdrawal period had not expired.

He made no effort,

however, to do so.
EL.

Defendant's Lack Of Compliance With Rule 5(a). Utah
Rules Of Appellate Procedure, Prevents Conversion Of
His Direct Appeal To An Interlocutory Appeal
Should this Court find that it lacks jurisdiction over

the direct appeal, defendant requests that it treat the
13

direct appeal as an interlocutory appeal. Appellant's Br.
at 12-13.

Defendant provides no authority for such novel

treatment of a direct appeal and does not explain how the
interests of justice, as opposed to defendant's own
interests, will be served by such unusual treatment.

Id.

Defendant overlooks the basic fact that he has failed
to cottrply with the requirements for perfecting an
interlocutory appeal.

The challenged order was not

certified as final by the lower court pursuant to rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Consequently,

defendant would have to comply with the filing requirements
of rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in order to
obtain interlocutory review of the order.

Instead of filing

with this Court a petition for permission to appeal from an
interlocutory order within twenty days after entry of the
trial court's order on February 27, 1996, defendant filed a
notice of appeal in the district court on March 21, which
notice was received by this Court on April 2--thirty-five
days after entry of the order.

Defendant's brief--which

would more closely resemble the required petition than the
14

notice of appeal--was filed in October, nearly eight months
after entry of the challenged order.
Accordingly, in order to grant his request, this Court
would have to invoke its power to suspend the provisions of
the appellate rules pursuant to rule 2, Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure.

However, rule 2 expressly provides

that this Court cannot suspend the provisions of rule 5(a).
As defendant cannot be excused from the requirements of
filing an interlocutory petition and offers no other basis
upon which this Court could consider his direct appeal to be
an interlocutory appeal, his request must fail.

POINT II
THE APPLICABLE STATUTES PERMIT SETTING JAIL TIME
AND A FINE AS CONDITIONS OF A PLEA IN ABEYANCE
Should this Court determine that the order is a final
order from which a direct appeal lies, it should reject
defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it imposed
certain conditions on defendant after accepting his plea in
abeyance.

15

A^.

Waiver; Imposition Of Fine
Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of a

"fine" of $925.00, claiming that section 77-2a-3 (5) (a)
prohibits imposition of a fine and demonstrates the
legislature's intent that wa fine constitutes a 'sentence.'"
Appellant's Br. at 14-15.

However, this Court need not

reach defendant's argument because he not only failed to
raise the issue below, but he made a conscious decision not
to do so, as demonstrated by the following exchange which
occurred at the February 26 hearing after a prolonged
discussion about the incarceration issue:
THE COURT: . . . I'll require that he pay a fine
and surcharge in the amount of $925.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me. Would that be more
appropriately termed an administrative fee? Let me -well, that's fine.
THE COURT: I'm not sure where you're going with
that.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'll withdraw that.
(R. 45A) . Addendum C.

Although the trial court invited

defendant to clarify his concern about imposition of the
fee, counsel declined to do so and made no effort thereafter
to challenge imposition of the fine.
16

Consequently, this

Court should not reach the issue.

See State v. Moreno. 910

P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.) (refusing to consider an issue
raised for the first time on appeal where defendant fails to
argue plain error or exceptional circumstances), cert.
denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); State V, Gordon, 886 P.2d
112, 117 (Utah App. 1994) (a defendant is not entitled to
relief on appeal for an invited error); State v. Stevenson,
884 P.2d 1287, 1293 (Utah App. 1994) (no relief warranted
for an invited error), cert, denied. 892 P.2d 13 (Utah
1995).
Moreover, even on the merits, defendant's claim fails,
as shown below.
B^_

Merits: Fine anfl jail Cpnflitipns
Defendant argues that the trial court essentially

sentenced him when it imposed, as conditions of the plea in
abeyance, that he pay a fine and that he be incarcerated *in
the Salt Lake County Jail until his counsel and probation
officer could arrange his acceptance to a qualified
treatment program. Appellant's Br. at 13-19.

He claims that

the "sentencing" violated Chapter 2a of Title 77, which
17

allows for sentencing only after violation of any of the
conditions relating to a plea in abeyance.

Id.

However,

this claim fails for the simple reason that the plain
language of the laws of this State permit the court to
impose such conditions when a plea in abeyance is accepted.
Defendant's argument presents a question of statutory
interpretation, which this Court reviews for correctness.
State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996).

The Court

looks first to the plain language of the statute, resorting
to other methods of statutory interpretation only if an
ambiguity is found in the plain language.

Id. at 373.

This

Court need look no further than the plain language of the
statute to decide this issue.
The trial court accepted defendant's plea of guilty to
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, but held that
plea in abeyance, pursuant to the agreement between the
State and defendant, on certain specified conditions (R. 2532).

Addenda B and D.

After hearing arguments on whether

the imposition of jail time constituted a sentence or a
permissible condition of the plea in abeyance statutes, the
18

trial court adopted the plain language of the abeyance
statutes and imposed several "additional conditions for the
plea in abeyance'' (R. 45) , including:

l)that the defendant

would "serve 1 year in the Box Elder County Jail with
release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be
arranged" and the remainder of the jail sentence be
"suspended upon successfully completing the inpatient
program" (R. 3 0); and 2) that the defendant "shall pay a
fine and surcharge in the amount of $925.00." (R. 30).
Addendum D.
The imposition of these conditions is specifically
authorized by the plain language of that chapter, which the
trial court correctly implemented.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5) (Supp. 1996), provides:
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in
abeyance agreement and pursuant to the terms of the
agreement:

(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable
plea in abeyance fee, which shall be allocated in

the same manner as if it had been paid as a fine
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine
which could have been imposed upon conviction and
sentencing for the same offense;

19

(b) order the defendant to pay all or a
portion of the costs of administration of the
agreement;
(c) order the defendant to pay restitution to
the victims of his actions as provided in Section
76-3-201;
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of
any rehabilitative program required by the terms
of the agreement; and

(e) ordey the defendant to comply with any
other conditions which could have been imposed as
conditions of probation upon conviction and
sentencing for the same offense,
(Emphasis added).

Addendum A.

The conditions incorporated

by reference into section 77-2a-3(5)(e) are set forth in
Utah Code Ann, § 77-18-1(8) (Supp. 1996):
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of
probation, the defendant may be required to perform any
or all of the following:

(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine
imposed at the time of being placed on probation:
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77,
Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for
whose support he is legally liable;
(d) participate in available treatment
programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail
not to exceed one year:
(f) serve a term of home confinement, which
may include the use of electronic monitoring;
(g) participate in community service
restitution programs, including the community
service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;

20

(h) pay for the costs of investigation,
probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the
victim or victims with interest in accordance with
Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the
court considers appropriate.
(Emphasis added).
In sum, a trial court may order a defendant whose plea
is held in abeyance to comply with any condition which could
have been imposed as a condition of probation; a defendant
may be required to serve up to one year in jail as a
condition of probation; therefore, the court may order a
defendant whose plea is held in abeyance to serve up to one
year in jail as a condition of the plea in abeyance. The
same is true for the $925.00 fine of which defendant
complains.

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-3(5)(a) (permitting

the court to impose upon defendant a nonrefundable fee up to
the amount of the maximum fine which could otherwise have
been imposed upon conviction of the offense to which he pled
guilty) and § 76-3-301 (Supp. 1995) (fine of $5,000 may be
imposed upon conviction of third degree felony). Whether
labeled "fine" or "fee," the plea in abeyance statutes
21

contemplate that defendant may be made to pay the full
amount levied in this case and that the amount may be levied
as a condition of the plea. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-2a-3(5) (e)
and -4(1).

Addendum A.

Defendant does not contest the fact that imprisonment
in jail is one of the conditions which can be imposed on a
probationer.

Instead, he claims that the "plain" meaning of

this part of the statute changes when it is read "in the
context of the plea in abeyance statute as a whole."
Appellant's Br. at 14. He argues that the imposition of
jail time constitutes a "sentence" under a literal
definition of that term, and that to interpret section 772a-3(5) (e) as permitting imposition of such a "sentence"
would render "meaningless" the legislature's direction that
no sentence will be imposed when the plea is accepted by the
court. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-l(l). Appellant's Br. at 1316.3
3

Defendant also claims that it deprives him of one of
the intended benefits of such a plea--the fact that he is
able to avoid serving a sentence. Appellant's Br. at 17-19.
Defendant baldly claims that the legislature "clearly"
intended that a plea in abeyance convey two benefits upon
22

Giving the language of section 77-2a-3(5)(e) its plain
meaning does not nullify the statute's direction that no
sentence be imposed upon the acceptance of a plea in
abeyance.

Defendant pled guilty to a third degree felony,

which carries an indeterminate sentence of up to five years
in the Utah State Prison, together with the possibility of
an enhancement of a consecutive indeterminate tenn of up to
five years for the use of a dangerous weapon.
Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (Supp. 1996).

Utah Code

While the trial court

imposed jail time pursuant to the plain language of sections
77-2a-3(5) (e) and 77-18-1(8), it could not, and did not,
impose the above prison sentence upon defendant, in full
compliance with the provisions of section 77-2a-l.

Should

defendant ultimately violate any of the conditions of the
defendants: 1) no conviction; and 2) no sentence, i.e., no
incarceration. Id. at 17-18. Not only is his position that
"no sentence" includes no jail time erroneous, as argued in
Point II, but the legislative history does not support his
claim. Senator Hillyard's explanation notes that both
defendant and the prosecutor benefit from a plea in
abeyance: if defendant complies with the conditions, then
the plea is dismissed; if he does not, then he proceeds to
sentencing without the time and effort of a trial. Senate
Hearing and Vote on S.B. 183, 50th Legislature, Day 39, Tape
50 (Feb. 18, 1993).
23

plea, the trial court would then be free to impose the
prison sentence, as contemplated by the statutes.
This interpretation reflects the legislature's
determination that the trial court must have latitude, short
of imposing the lawful prison sentence which could be
imposed upon conviction of the offense, to determine the
appropriate conditions in any given case upon receipt of all
the information necessary to make a decision as to the
conditions of the plea.

In this case, it was the receipt of

information from, and a recommendation by, AP&P that
resulted in the challenged condition.4

The trial court's

imposition on defendant of conditions which could have been
imposed as conditions of probation fully complies with the
plain language of the statute while leaving in tact the
statutory requirement that both entry of a judgment of
conviction and imposition of sentence must await a violation
of the plea conditions.

4

The information from AP&P is not part of the appellate
record and is not challenged on appeal.
24

Moreover, once defendant learned of the specific
conditions, he was still able to seek withdrawal of his plea
because the thirty-day withdrawal period had not expired.
However, he made no effort to do so.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully
requests that this Court dismiss defendant's appeal for lack
of jurisdiction or, alternatively, affirm the trial court's
imposition of conditions pursuant to Chapter 2a of Title 77.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J>

day of December,

1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

77-2a-2

PLEAS IN ABEYANCE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah
1989).

CHAPTER 2a
PLEAS IN ABEYANCE
Section
77-2a-l.
77~2a-2.

77-2a<3.

77-2a-l.

Definitions.
Plea in abeyance agreement —
Negotiation — Contents —
Terms of agreement — Waiver
of time for sentencing.
Manner of entry of plea — Powers
of court.

Section
77-2a-4.

Violation of plea in abeyance
agreement — Hearing — Entry
of judgment and imposition of
sentence — Subsequent prosecutions.

Definitions.

For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the
prosecution and the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest
from the defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction
against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he comply
with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) "Plea in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into
between the prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms
and conditions upon which, following acceptance of the agreement by the
court, a plea may be held in abeyance.
History: C. 1958, 77-JU-l, enacted by L.
1993, eh. S3,1 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 26.

77-2a-2, Plea in abeyance agreement — Negotiation —
Contents — Terms of agreement — Waiver of
time for sentencing.
(1) At any time after acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest but prior to
entry ofjudgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, the court may, upon
motion of both the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, hold the plea in
abeyance and not enter judgment of conviction against the defendant nor
impose sentence upon the defendant within the time periods contained in Rule
22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(2) The defendant shall be represented by counsel during negotiations for a
plea in abeyance and at the time of acknowledgment and affirmation of any
plea in abeyance agreement unless the defendant shall have knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to counsel.
(3) The defendant has the right to be represented by counsel at any court
hearing relating to a plea in abeyance agreement.
(4) (a) Any plea in abeyance agreement entered into between the prosecution and the defendant and approved by the court shall include a foil,
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detailed recitation of the requirements and conditions agreed to by the
defendant and the reason for requesting the court to hold the plea in
abeyance.
(b) If the plea is to a felony or any combination of misdemeanors and
felonies, the agreement shall be in writing and shall, prior to acceptance
by the court, be executed by the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and
the defendant's counsel in the presence of the court.
(5) A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18 months
if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the
plea was to any degree of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and
felonies.
(6) A plea in abeyance agreement shall not be approved unless the defendant, before the court, and any written agreement, knowingly and intelligently
waives time for sentencing as designated in Rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
History: C. 1953, T7-2a-2, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 82,ft4.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 26.

77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers of court
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement
shall be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon
finding that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the
agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction
and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the
case.
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a
plea in abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the offense,
dismiss the case only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense
pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section
76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense.
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on
probation to the court under Section 77-18-1.
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and
pursuant to the terms of the agreement:
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee,
which shall be allocated in the same manner as if it had been paid as a fine
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which could have been
imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense;
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of administration of the agreement;
(c) order the defendant to pay full restitution to the victims of his
actions as provided in Section 76-3-201;
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of any rehabilitative program
required by the terms of the agreement; and
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(e) order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which could
have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense.
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the
prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney
not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not subject to judicial review.
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense
against a victim who is under the age of 14.
History: C. 1958, 77-2a-3, enacted by L.
1993, ch. 82, ft 5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.

77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — Hearing — Entry of judgment and imposition of sentence — Subsequent prosecutions.
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement,
information comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that
the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the
request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit,
or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear
before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court
should not find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the
agreement should not be terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the
court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term
or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the
defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the
defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to termination of the agreement shall
be credited against any fine imposed by the court.
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry
of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any
independent prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation
of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original plea was placed
in abeyance.
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-4, enacted by L.
1W3, ch. 82,ft6.
Effective Dates, — Laws 1993, ch. 82 be-

came effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI. Sec. 25.
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77-2a-3. Manner of entry of plea — Powers of court.
(1) Acceptance of any plea in anticipation of a plea in abeyance agreement
shall be done in full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
(2) A plea in abeyance agreement may provide that the court may, upon
finding that the defendant has successfully completed the terms of the
agreement:
(a) reduce the degree of the offense and enter judgment of conviction
and impose sentence for a lower degree of offense; or
(b) allow withdrawal of defendant's plea and order the dismissal of the
case.
(3) Upon finding that a defendant has successfully completed the terms of a
plea in abeyance agreement, the court shall reduce the degree of the offense,
dismiss the case only as provided in the plea in abeyance agreement or as
agreed to by all parties. Upon sentencing a defendant for any lesser offense
pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may not invoke Section
76-3-402 to further reduce the degree of the offense.
(4) The court may require the Department of Corrections to assist in the
administration of the plea in abeyance agreement as if the defendant were on
probation to the court under Section 77-18-1.
(5) The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and
pursuant to the terms of the agreement:
(a) order the defendant to pay a nonrefundable plea in abeyance fee,
which shall be allocated in the same manner as if it had been paid as a fine
and shall not exceed in amount the maximum fine which could have been
imposed upon conviction and sentencing for the same offense;
(b) order the defendant to pay all or a portion of the costs of administration of the agreement;
(c) order the defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his actions as
provided in Section 76-3-201;
(d) order the defendant to pay the costs of any rehabilitative program
required by the terms of the agreement; and
(e) order the defendant to comply with any other conditions which could
have been imposed as conditions of probation upon conviction and sentencing for the same'offense.
(6) A court may not hold a plea in abeyance without the consent of both the
prosecuting attorney and the defendant. A decision by a prosecuting attorney
not to agree to a plea in abeyance is not subject to judicial review.
(7) No plea may be held in abeyance in any case involving a sexual offense
against a victim who is under the age of 14.
History: C. 1953, 77-2a-3, enacted by I*
1993, chu 82, f 6; 1995, ch. 301,ft2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

MICHIE
Law Publishers
Charlottesville, Virginia

77-2a-3

meat, effective May 1, 1995, deleted full" before "restitution" in Subsection (6Xc).

ADDENDUM B

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION, AGREEMENT, AND
ORDER FOR PLEA IN
ABEYANCE

vs.

1
!
::
!
:

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,

J!

Case No.

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

qSl&SPW)

:

Come now the parties hereto, the State of Utah through its
undersigned representative, and the defendant both personally and
through his undersigned attorney, and jointly request the Court
to accept a Plea in Abeyance in this matter, pursuant to the
terms and conditions specified herein, and, further, agree to the
terms and conditions specified herein regarding a Plea in
Abeyance:
1.

The defendant shall enter a plea of guilty to the

following charge or charges:
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE, ON OR ABOUT
DECEMBER 6, 1995.
2.

The Court shall accept the defendants plea of guilty,

but not enter judgment of conviction nor impose sentence, and all
time periods otherwise imposed by applicable law regarding the
time for entry of judgment or conviction against the defendant,
and the time to impose sentence upon the defendant are hereby
specifically waived.

•ICSOPTTMEO

3.

The defendant is represented by the undersigned attorney

and has been during negotiations for the Plea in Abeyance.
4.

The plea entered shall be held in abeyance for a period

of 36 months.
5.

The defendant specifically understands and agrees that

if, at any time prior to the expiration of the term during which
the plea is to be held in abeyance, the Court finds that the
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or
condition of the Judgment and Order entered in this matter, the
Court may then terminate the agreement and enter judgment of
conviction and impose sentence against the defendant for the
offense to which the original plea was entered.
6.

Upon the Court finding that the defendant has

successfully completed the terms and conditions of this Plea in
Abeyance Agreement, the Court shall dismiss the charge of
Aggravated Assault.
7.

The defendant shall be supervised by the Utah State

Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole Department,
as if the defendant were on Probation.
8.

The special terms and conditions of this Plea in

Abeyance Agreement, which shall be administered and supervised as
if the defendant were on Probation, are to be as later imposed by
the court following recommendations being received by the court
from the Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole.
9.

The parties understand and agree that the Court retains

2

OOO(J2;>

jurisdiction to make such other and further orders, conditions,
and terms as it deems necessary.
DATED this 29th day of January, 1996.

BARON
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
~-"KlCHAEL D. BOUWHU
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
APPROVAL AND ORDER
The Court, after reading and considering the above Motion
and Agreement for Plea in Abeyance, and having fully considered
the same, and good cause appearing therefore, hereby approves the
above Agreement/ grants the Motion of the parties to accept the
Plea in Abeyance, and will enter its Order accordingly.
DATED this 29th day of January, 1996.

000Vz\

ADDENDUM C

ORIGINAL
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
2

3

BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

4
5

Plaintiff,
vs .

Case No. 951000140

6

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,

7

Defendant.

8

9
10

Transcript of Sentencing Hearing
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
Feburary 26, 1996
Brigham City, Utah

11
12
13

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff

JON J. BUNDERSON
County Attorney
45 North First East
Brighain City, UT
84302

For the Defendant

MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS
County Public Defender
Suite 102
2568 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
Brigham

P

CitJ I ft£Q4302-0873
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reflect

The defendant
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review
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is before
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time
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client?

opportunity

All

to
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951000140, State of Utah
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THE COURT:
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today.
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time.
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conditions which could have been
of probation
same

upon conviction

imposed
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conditions

and sentencing

for
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offense.
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ambiguity

in the statute
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directly
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a conviction
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court
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sentence.
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sense

of sentencing.
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something

then it is sentencing.

We just

the
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reason

if you
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sentencing,

is,

the State says here, impose

upon imposition

that doesn't make

is.

this subsection

the State would

could

impose
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their
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and
call it

else.
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Except
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of
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In other words, one of the things you can't do is send
someone

to prison*
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read

the statute
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correct.
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as to how

and how these things

are

out.

4

I state that for the record because I

5

don't

6

Honor,

7

governed

8

I recognize

9

statute

know what will happen,
that under

but our position

a plea in abeyance

by the statute, we cannot
that

impose

10

administrative

11

other

the court

conditions

13

from

the position

14

nothing

15

do all of these

16

I'm

17

theses

18

rendering

19

has simply

20

things

21

do anything

of a defense
that

and impose

that

programs

specifically

and

whatnot.

There

comes
is

says you

jail time.

jail

time, we're
and the

can
What

the court would

do

really
legislature

up all of

can do if the court

can

these
simply

anyway.

I don't know if that sheds any light

23

the court, but we think

it is an ambiguous

24

We are asking

to interpret

25

the defendant.

the court

the

is that if we do all of

trees in printing

the court

under

an

attorney.

the statute meaningless
wasted

time,

of the fine, and

things but not impose

to the court

things

as

to the court, obviously,

in the statute

arguing

can impose

such as alcohol

My argument

jail

can, obviously,
and

is, Your

agreement,

impose

fee up to the amount

conditions

12

22

on the legislature's

We're asking

for

statute*

it in favor of

the court

to interpret

0 0 0 0 f,
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it

in such a way that jail
I heard

time is not

the court

others, and particularly
just previous
there

case there would
In this case

sentencing

Mr. Gochis, who was

in the two cases.

that

Gochis

class A conviction.
if he

conditions.
Isn't

that by itself

reason

even if he served what would

the same equivalent
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

out

In the

there will be no conviction

THE COURT:

on

sentenced

I would point

be a resulting

complies with the

to do it f

impose

to this, although

is a difference

allowed.

No.

for him

otherwise

be

sentence?
To do the jail
To enter

agreement.

When

no record.

There is still

time?

into a plea

in

abeyance

it's all over he can come away
an obvious

with

incentive

or

benefit.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
that

the legislature

away with

That's

intended

two benefits.

and the second
that

from

I've

cited.

that

that

My argument
the defendant

One is no sentence be

there be no conviction.

the first paragraph

I think I've
submit

correct.

under

come

imposed

I get

that statute

made my argument.

is

that

I'll

it.

THE COURT:

Does the defendant

Paere

9

desire

to address

the

court?
MR, HUNSAKER:

that to light
provisions
comes

close to the top of the

or two.

I like that

guilty unless I messed
interpreted

from

the

as

is what I

the key to that is the fact

fact

can go through

the system,

intended

out what

would
To me

to be conferred

it wants to impose

in

by

the

cannot

as a

probation.

THE COURT:
and

carry

Honor,

the defendant

I see no reason why this court

any restrictions
of

that

with

in abeyance,

and come away with no record.

is the benefit

legislature.

concur

and position, Your

that

be a probation

State?

As far as the plea

it's always been my feeling

Based

the plea

will now impose
conditions

be sentenced

Your Honor, we would

the recommendation.

received

if I didn't

up on my probation,

Anything

MR. BUNDERSON:

condition

first

idea, that

I wouldn't

it

it myself.

THE COURT:

impose

the

of the plea in abeyance, as he said,

mess up on my probation

that

bringing

to the court, because when I read

in pretty

paragraph

I appreciate Mr. Bouwhuis

upon the

in abeyance

the following

for the plea
Number

recommendation

in

agreement,

conditions

as

the

court

additional

abeyance.

one, I'll

require

that

the

OG';:;. Page 10

defendant
jail.

serve up to one year in the Box Elder

I note that he has already

do not require
served.

any specific

served

additional

treatment

that program.
program.

program,

He must

I'll

time to be
into an

complete

the

If he flunks out of it and comes back
agreement

into effect

in that he'll have a judgment

So you have

to complete

the counseling

Once he completes
counseling

released

and

program,

suspend

I

allow him to enter

successfully

the court, his plea in abeyance

alcohol

82 days.

As soon as he can be matriculated

inpatient

County

that

will

before
then go

on the plea.

program.

successfully,

I will

an

allow him to be

the remaining

balance

of the

jail

time .
I'll
surcharge

require

in the amount

MR. BOUWHUIS:
appropriately
well,

that's

termed

that he pay a fine

and

of $925.

Excuse me.

Would

that be more

an administrative

fee?

Let me

—

fine.

THE COURT:

I'm not sure where you're going

with

that.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:
must

complete

any after care

I'll

withdraw

All right.

the inpatient
that

that.

As I indicated
program

is required

successfully

for a year

Page 11

to him,
and

following

he

completion

of the

program.

Number
Antabuse

as prescribed

by AP&P.

that he

by a physician

I note for the record

five previous
alcohol

four, I require

intoxication

take

and as monitored

that he has at

charges.

least

It's obvious

is ruining his life besides getting him

trouble.

I expect

that the Antabuse will be

The only way I would waive
have a physician
feasible

for this
I'll

AA meetings
or consume

indicate

that requirement
that

that's not

into

taken.
is if we

medically

individual.
require, number

five, that he

at least once a week.

that he may be staying,

be at any place where

alcohol

attend

That he not

any alcohol nor have any in his

nor anywhere

that

and

possess

residence

that he not

is the main item

on the

menu .
He must submit
bodily

fluids

to random

and/or breath

testing

and random

search

seizure of his personal property

by any

enforcement

compliance

conditions

officer
of

to determine

inpatient
enter

employment
and

and

law
with

the

probation.

That he obtain
verifiable

of his

and maintain

once he completes

incarceration

lawful,
all of the

requirements.

into a standard probation

And

that he

agreement, which

means

OOOiXKi
Page
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1

he'll have

to abide by all laws.

2

convicted

3

Do you understand

of any criminal

You can't

offenses during

MR. HUNSAKER:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, Your

Honor.

You and Mr. Bouwhuis

6

probation

7

out where you can get into a program.

8

understand,

9

this to address
could

11

13

flunk

out on my
THE COURT:

pay it now,

16

will have

17

probation

19 J

your

that I'm

the problem.

to find

I want you

trying

to

to design

If you flunk out, you

on this very

charge.

Yes, Your Honor, I realize

that.

am I to pay this fine now or in the event I

15

18

and

to get busy and start

Mr. Hunsaker,

MR. HUNSAKER:
Can we —

14

officer need

end up at the prison

12

probation.

that?

4

10

be

probation?
You will owe the fine.

I expect you

to pay

to pay it.

it during

That's all.
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Thank

the period

Good

If you

If you can't,
of your

luck to you

you

20
21
22
23
24
25

OOOli
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can
you

C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE

OF

UTAH

SS
COUNTY OF BOX

ELDER)

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that

the sentencing

proceed-

ings were

taken before me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a

Certified

Shorthand

Reporter

and Notary

for the State of Utah, residing
That
stenotype

at Brigham

said proceedings were reported

in and

City,

and that a full, true and

transcription

is set

forth

Utah

by me in

and thereafter were by me transcribed

typewriting;

13,

Public

into

correct

in the pages numbered

2 to

inclusive.
I further

was filed with

certify

that the original

the Court Clerk, First District

Box Elder County, Brigham
I also certify
of the parties
interested

City,

that I am not

in the event

Court,

Utah*
associated

to said matter and that

Witness my hand
City, Utah,

transcript

with

any

I am not

thereof.

and official

seal at

this 22nd day of March,

1996.

Al.
Rodney

M.f/Felshaw,

My Commission Expires:
January 4, 2000

Brigham

IJJUL^
C.S.R.,

R.P.R.

~~ N° t a r v Pub™ ma ^
RODNEY M. FELSHAW g

•

Page
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Rrst District Court
43 N Main
Bngham City, Utah 64302
My Commission Expires
January 4,2000
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

i
l
!:

vs.

:

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,

!i

Defendant.

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
ON PLEA HELD IN ABEYANCE

Case No. 951000140

:

Defendant appeared in open court/ with his attorney, Michael
D. Bouwhuis, on February 26, 1996, with the State being
represented by Roger F. Baron, and the defendant having
previously entered into a Plea in Abeyance Agreement which was
accepted and approved by the Court/ and the parties having
previously moved for the Court to accept defendants Plea in
Abeyance, which Motion the Court granted/ and the defendant
having entered his plea of guilty, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the crime

or crimes of:
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3RD DEGREE
2.

The Court has accepted defendant's plea, and has found

the same to be given voluntarily and knowingly, and the plea

shall be held in abeyance pursuant to the terms and conditions of
this Order.
3.

The defendant is hereby placed under the supervision of

the Adult Probation and Parole Office, Utah Department of
Corrections, and is ordered to comply with the terms and
conditions hereof as if the defendant were on Probation.
4.

The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the

Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and comply
strictly with its terms and conditions, including any search and
seizure waivers contained therein.
5.

The defendant shall report to the Department and to the

Court whenever required.
6.

The defendant shall violate no law, either Federal,

State, or Municipal.
7. The defendant shall pay a fine and surcharge in the
amount of $925.00.
8.

The defendant shall serve 1 year in the Box Elder County

Jail with release to an inpatient program as soon as it can be
arranged.

The remainder of the jail sentence shall be suspended

upon successfully completing the inpatient program.
9.

The defendant is to take antabuse as prescribed by a

physician and as monitored by Adult Probation and Parole.
10.

The defendant shall attend at least one AA meeting per

week and turn in verification of attendance to his supervising
agent•

2

009"0 *

11.

The defendant is not to consume nor possess alcohol at

his residence or any other location and shall not frequent places
where alcohol is used or sold as the main item on the menu.
12.

The defendant shall submit to random search and seizure

of his person, residence, vehicle or property without probable
cause and without a search warrant to determine compliance with
his plea in abeyance and these conditions. The defendant shall
submit to random testing of his bodily fluids and/or breath at
the request of any law enforcement officer.
13.

The defendant is to obtain and maintain lawful

verifiable employment as approved by his probation officer.
14.

The defendant is to enter into and successfully

complete an inpatient program and any recommended aftercare for a
period of one year.
The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and
further Orders as it may deem necessary from time to time, and,
further, retains jurisdiction to terminate the terms and
conditions hereof and enter defendant's plea of guilty.

The

Court further retains jurisdiction to sentence the defendant,
either at such time as this Order is terminated, or at such time

3

as the defendant successfully completes the terms and conditions
hereof•
DATED this

^?

day of February, 1996.

RICT JUDGE /

ATTEST:
SHARON HANCEY, COURT

BY^^Deputy
J/A/U/W6
?K/l
Clerk
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